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Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences- Volume VI, 1978

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF POSSIBLE CLIMATIC CHANGES
ROBERT D. MIEWALD

Department of Political Science
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

There is something rather ludicrous about a learned
paper on the political and social implications of the end of
the world. Obviously, since we do not have much reliable
historical information about this sort of event, the author can
only offer some speculations which, however well-informed,
are of debatable quality. And the reader, insofar as he or she
actually believes in impending disaster, will doubtless be disappointed by the absence of any specific recommendations
about how to survive. Yet while this exercise may seem
foolish, it is undertaken because of the conviction that it
would be even more foolish for our society to continue as if
drastic climatic change were an impossibility.

Of course, it may be a little too dramatic to speak of
"the end of the world." Human beings, as members of a hardy
and cunning species, shall prevail; the human organism can
cope. But man is more than an organism. He is a highly gregarious animal, and it is the social arrangements he has built
up-which in fact defme his existence-that would be imperiled by a severe modification of the environment. It is the
end of the social world we speak of here, and that could be as
deadly as a more tangible sort of disaster.
Again, past experience is a poor guide in contemplating
twentieth-century responses to permanent climatic change. In
pre-historic times, whole peoples may have been able to
migrate in search of a more hospitable environment. Our complex social and political institutions make that alternative
impossible today. Quite obviously, most of us are unlikely
nomads; one cannot pick up and move a large metropolis.
Just as important, even if we were mobile, there would be no
place to go; aggressively guarded international boundaries
prevent the peaceful movement of large numbers across the
face of the earth. In fact, we know enough about the selfish
side of our fellow Americans-the attempts of some communities to limit further growth is a notable example-to

realize that refugees would not be welcomed with open arms
even in more temperate parts of the United States.
If we view social institutions as artifacts designed to provide stability in the face of scarcity (i.e., valued things in any
society can seldom be equally distributed), then it is plain to
see that an intensification of scarcity through natural causes
would have serious consequences. The easiest doomsday
scenario can be drawn from the field of international relations. The major military powers derive their strength from
their access to natural resources. It would not be surprising
if these powers, including the United States, should begin to
covet the bounty of weaker neighbors if climatic change were
threatening their gross national product. That is, to ensure
national survival, the more powerful states might be inclined
to impose their will on other countries. At the same time,
those states living on a small reserve of food might well be
impelled to follow an expansionist course. One can trace many
routes from the onset of long-range climatic change to the
Third (and last) World War. The redefmition of the "haves"
and the "have-nots" would undermine what little international
stability we now have.

Climatic change would also have the gravest impact on
domestic politics. Even now, in what we consider to be "normal" conditions, there are clearly apparent defects in our
political machinery. We have succeeded as a nation for two
hundred years, but the strains in our system are now so noticeable that the next hundred is problematic. Our natural
resources have given us a comfortable cushion so that we have
been able to practice a relatively peaceful style of politics.
With or without climatic change, it is not fearmongering to
suggest that the good old days are gone forever.
It is already true that our society has become so complex, so fragile, so interdependent, that we are vulnerable to
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even very brief deviations from the normal climate. The point
was graphically illustrated recently in New York City. A century ago, a thunderstorm was only a passing nuisance; today,
if we are to believe Consolidated Edison, it is enough to loosen
the social fabric for millions of people and to disrupt communications throughout the entire nation. On the other coast,
a bit of folk wisdom has it that two hundred years ago when it
rained, people got wet; today in Los Angeles, when it rainsand brings traffic accidents, earthslides and flash floodspeople get dead. Simply put, we are so complicated that
natural events are no longer regarded as natural; we defy them
and are the inevitable losers in our attempts to fool Mother
Nature.
The issues posed by the distribution of natural resources,
especially water, further illuminate the problem. Water resources policy has been, to use the jargon of political science,
"distributive." That is to say, water has been regarded as a
nearly free good belonging to a single landowner or, at most, a
very small geographic area; the idea that one can claim "This
is my water" does not strike Americans as unusual despite
the worldwide scope of the hydrologic cycle. However, in the
exploitation or supplementation of this resource, smaillocalities have demanded, and generally received, support from
larger units of government. Water has been seen as something
to which every American citizen has a god-given right, regardless of cost and of more economical uses. In the not too distant past, our apparently limitless supply of wealth and water
convinced policy-makers that everyone could receive his payoffs. Government has seldom said "no" to anyone wanting
water, for whatever purpose. We have been just as gloriously
profligate in other areas, such as energy, which would also be
affected by climatic change.
We were given a cruel preview of what is in store during
the winter of 1976-77. With extremely cold weather in the
East and drought throughout the western states, many people
could see that there simply was not enough slack in our
economy to sustain everyone in the manner to which they
had become accustomed. Yet the political system has not yet
dealt with any of the hard choices implicit in the facts of the
matter. Indeed, when President Carter made a bold move to
re-examine a number of pending water projects, most of
which are products of the traditional pork-barrel style of
politics, he suffered a serious defeat. This was in spite of the
fact that the completion of the projects, especially in the
semi-arid West, will only encourage the further population of
those areas most susceptible to future climatic shock.
The crunch has already arrived, even if we do not face
further scarcity induced by climatic change. There is not
enough to go around, at least as we presently make allocative
decisions. We delude ourselves if we think there is some easy
technological fix; even if we put scientists in Boston to work
on turning water into gas, and those in Berkeley on converting
gas into water, our finite resources cannot be stretched far
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enough. Attempts at providing public relief to those areas
impacted by natural disaster have become, even in the short
term, prohibitively expensive. For example, by July 31,1977
drought relief efforts had cost taxpayers nearly one bil1io~
dollars; and the number of affected areas included 41 states
and over two-thirds of all counties. The question naturally
arises: When the whole country is declared a disaster area,
who will pay the bill?
Politicians have recently taken to orating about the
coming "era of limits" and to issuing calls for the development
of a less wasteful "life style." So far, these leaders have found
it hard to practice what they preach. But we cannot heap the
blame on the deficiencies of our statesmen. This is, after all,
a democratic society, and one can make a good argument that
public decision-makers are only giving the public the sort of
government it wants and, for better or worse, what it deserves.
The whole question gets back to the degree of congruence between social reality, which we can control, and physical reality. To a certain extent, any human progress depends
upon the ability of people to overcome their reality; the
course of civilization is a triumph over those doctrinaires of
one true faith or another who are always happy to assure us
that any change is impossible. We in the Midwest should be
especially grateful that the pioneers displayed a heroic contempt for the facts of the situation and proceeded to develop
what was then the Great American Desert. There must come a
point, however, when the intractability of the physical world
will overwhelm the most strenuous human efforts. For example, those migrants to southern California from Iowa and
lliinois who feel that there is some inalienable right to a lush
bluegrass lawn and ornamental ponds in their backyards are
trying to live in a world which simply does n')t exist. Southern
California is a desert and we cannot afford the cosmetics
needed to disguise that fact.
Viable social institutions should be sensitive enough to
adjust to changes in environmental reality. Unfortunately,
that conclusion has often inspired technicians to assert that
they should be society's eyes and ears-and hands with which
to force people to do what is "right." But this is not a matter
for social engineering and no easy institutional answers come
to mind, beyond the most obvious, i.e., the imposition of a
centralized allocation system which would have the power to
beat each individual into conformance with some predetermined plan of distribution. Such systems have existed often
enough in mankind's history-Egypt, Persia, China, Peru-and
all have ultimately collapsed. Moreover, to purchase sheer
survival at the price of despotism would be repugnant to anyone with a sense of human dignity.
A democratic system requires that the scientists and
other technicians remain "on tap and not on top." But even in
that role, the experts can perform a valuable service. To begin
with, we need much more basic research into the relationship

between society and environment during periods of climatic
stress. As we have just learned, there is no solid information
about the impact of drought on social and political institutions and each time this sort of event occurs we are unprepared. In another area, scientists must continue to educate
the public about the vagaries of climate. It would seem that
we are a people obsessed with weather, and weather forecasting is both folk art and science. At the same time, we are
climatological illiterates. Thus we brood about whether it
will rain tomorrow on our picnic or parade, but we do not
spend much time wondering if it will rain in ten years so that
we can continue to eat.
In good times and bad, a democratic system must still
depend upon the shared perceptions of all its citizens. All
members of the community must adjust to a new physical
reality, as painful as that adjustment may be. And if the adjustment is to be healthy, it must be more than a debilitating
sense of resignation. To persevere in spite of a changing climate, that is the challenge. The results of this symposium on
climatic change, it is hoped, will be one contribution to the
difficult business of reconciling the social and physical realities.

To return to the original question, then, what will be
the social and political implications of climatic change? The
only reasonable answer is "it depends." The possible dislocations are now beyond calculation. How we will respond to
these dislocations is still another matter. An informed public
may be able to respond to new and terrifying environmental
problems without a fatal amount of divisiveness if-and this
is a very big if-the public cooperates in the construction of
a new social reality.
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